Abstract-As compared to load demand, frequent wind energy intermittencies produce large short-term (sub 1-h to 3-h) deficits (and surpluses) in the energy supply. These intermittent deficits pose systemic and structural risks that will likely lead to energy deficits that have significant reliability implications for energy system operators and consumers. This work provides a toolset to help policy makers quantify these first-order risks. The thinking methodology/framework shows that increasing wind energy penetration significantly increases the risk of loss in California. In addition, the work presents holistic risk tables as a general innovation to help decision makers quickly grasp the full impact of risk.
In this context, risk is reduced to quantitative dollar-measures of energy-consumer losses due to power disruptions induced by wind intermittency. Risk also includes incremental moneys diverted towards wind-firming resources that may be incurred in the form of higher rates by energy-consumers. "Systemic risk" is tied to the sub 3-h operation of the energy grid. Because wind energy is random, sudden power fluctuation may create deficits that cannot be compensated for within a 10-min (or longer) window. This type of risk affects the entire grid, or major segments of it, on a dynamic basis. However, the grid, by design, contains fixed generating and transmission assets that are capacity-constrained. Thus, while the grid may contain enough energy reserves to compensate for wind-energy-intermittency, it may not be possible to dispatch these reserves to areas affected by wind deficits within 10-min (or longer) time windows; this is the so-called congestion-related problem. In addition, while different control mandates call for immediate (within 15 min) restoration of contingency reserves following disturbances [8] , the effect of frequent wind-related disturbances on depleted (and partially recovered) reserves remains to be understood. These complications are not included in this work.
Structural risk is that associated with chronic shortfalls due to insufficient energy generation. This is a strategic planning problem that may stem from current use of macro-exchange equations in which annualized average energy from wRPS sources is made equivalent to energy produced from other nonrenewable sources. Generally, the goal of wind-power development is to retire carbon dioxide-producing fossil fired plants or significantly curtail their use. As the wRPS penetration level grows, in lieu of fossil-fired 1 plants, the grid may not have enough reserve power to compensate for those instances in which wind power is zero or a low fraction of nameplate power. 2 Structural risk is a resource adequacy problem.
In this work, the focus is on systemic risk quantification from the energy-consumer's perspective-not safety, as is more common in nuclear energy. Under normal conditions (i.e., no storm or excessive energy demand), using theoretical best-case forecasting [9] , high levels of wRPS integration pose risks that may not be adequately quantified or mitigated. For example, in planning for grid stability/reliability, the current North American Reliability Corporation (NERC) balancing, regulation, and contingency standards focus on maintaining "Interconnection steady-state frequency within defined limits by balancing real power demand and supply in real-time" (blue) and windfirming-gas-hydro,Ê (orange).
[10], [11] . However, these standards do not explicitly define or quantify energy-consumer risk in high wRPS scenarios. At a basic level, for example, the contingency rules require 5% hydroelectric and up to 7% thermal generation to be available within each 10-min epoch. This contingency generation standard still allows for disruption of power to clients under so-called demand response (DR) procedures. Thus, from the standpoint of the energy-consumer, DR response represents risk. This work provides a toolset for policy makers struggling to make the right energy policy choices that will have profound multi-decades impact. In our view, proactive RPS energy policy choices must be balanced with appropriate quantification and mitigation of systemic and structural risk. The consequence of inadequate risk quantification strategy possibly exposes the state to energy deficit, or uncontrolled rate hike, crises in the next two decades.
Why should Californians take this seriously? There is precedence of energy instability in our recent past; in the structural energy crises of 2000-2001, it is estimated that California lost $40 to $45 billion-about 3.5% of Gross State Product (GSP) [12] . During this period, the state experienced rolling blackouts (load shedding) over 38 days [13] as energy demand exceeded supply by an average of 600 MW. In some cases, electricity customers lost power for up to 16 h. 3 Again, as cited in [1] , notable recent precedents exist in Texas and Denmark [14] , [15] .
A note about reading this document: The purpose is to provide an analytics framework for energy risk quantification. Much of the background methodology is detailed in [9] . It is possible that businesses and governments will not stand by and allow wRPS risks to become chronic. The logical action is that risk mitigation infrastructures will be added to cope with the inherent intermittencies of wind energy. One essential component of risk mitigation infrastructure may include utility-scale storage, as it becomes available.
II. WIND ENERGY RISK ANALYTICS

A. Background From Prior Work
As noted in Section I, this work is based on the detailed analytics presented in [9] . The formulation creates wind profiles based on summation of time-series energy vectors from 801 wind sites dispersed across the state using wind modeling data from 2004 ( Consistent with prior work, wind energy is always given the highest commitment scheduling priority as a primary requisite for satisfying CA AB 32 requirements. Fig. 2 shows the application of the representative wind vector (strip 1) to the intermediate commit scheduling vector described in [9] . The wind-firming-gas-hydro 4 is defined as the energy in the intermediate schedule minus the energy from wind as shown in (1):
The associated forecast wind-firming-gas-hydro vector is defined in (2), where is the forecast energy from wind. This vector serves as the dynamic threshold for measuring generation to demand parity in 10-min epochs: Fig. 3 . Wind-firming-gas-hydro (E ) minus wind-firming-gas-hydro forecast (E ).
(2)
In addition to providing a very good "forecast" (which is possible because we have the benefit of looking at historical data), the may also encompass other grid non-idealities; e.g., the energy errors that result from ramping generators in parallel to balance, in some cases, up to 6 GW of power within 10 min or, the nonzero lag times associated with automatic generation control (AGC); the latter are set to zero in [9] .
In Monte Carlo sensitivity simulations, there is very little change in the properties of the aggregate wind vector. The gross energy deficit, which is an important component in this risk methodology, described in Section II-D and shown in Fig. 3 , is the difference between and . We define the contingency energy reserve as 7% of the forecast wind-firming-gas-hydro plus an additional 0.1 GWh capacity; the wind-firming-gas-hydro generation vector is the difference between the intermediate schedule and energy from wind. In this formulation, the contingency reserves are made up of only spinning generators.
B. Faulty Energy-Exchange Macro Equation
Without significant utility-scale storage, wind energy should not be equated with energy from conventional sources (e.g., fossil-based). The underlying risk is that wind energy has large random short-term (sub 1-h to 3-h) intermittencies, as shown in Fig. 2 (strips 1 and 2) , which necessitate constant wind-firming compensation as described in [9] . The energy-exchange macro equations equate the statistical average energy from wRPS generator sites to the absolute energy produced from conventional sources. Moreover, the statistical averages are often derived from data measured in annual terms. This type of averaging masks the short-term intermittencies that are important for grid stability. So, effectively, there are two or more 5 levels of averaging that lead to a faulty outcome.
Wind energy dispatch is a real-time scheduling problem; 1 GWh of energy from a fossil fired plant of energy from any wind farm (or collection of wind farms). To make the macro energy-exchange equation "work" today, California relies on interruptible power agreements with large energy consumers [16] -this so-called demand-side compensation [formally, "demand response" (DR)]-is another major element of risk. As shown by the precedence of California's 2000-2001 energy crises, large businesses that use these interruptible power contracts are much less tolerant of blackouts. During the energy crises, as exemplified by Fruit Growers Supply Co., a number of companies either sought to extricate themselves from these contracts [17] (see Section II-I) or chose to keep power flowing at expensive premium rates. If we use precedence as a guide, then the reliance on interruptible power contracts poses a serious risk to grid stability.
C. Definition of Risk as Used in This Work
Formally, risk,
, is the product of two components: (The probability of an Energy Deficit, ) (The Impact of Energy Deficits, ):
It is our goal to present solutions that comply with (3). When not possible, we will use a set of heuristics that follow the spirit of the equation.
D. Definition of Energy Deficit
Measured at 10-min intervals, energy deficit is the difference between the actual wind-firming-gas-hydro generation vector and forecast wind-firming-gas-hydro vector plus 7% contingency reserve capacity as shown in (4): (4) where, as defined in [9] , is derived from the intermediate schedule vector minus the energy generated from wind according to (1) . We assume that the wind-firming plus contingency reserve capacity of 7% comprise the total balancing and regulation energy, as described in [9] , required to compensate for the short-term intermittencies in wind energy output. Implicit in this assumption is the requirement that the fast compensation reserves must have nonstochastic real-time stability as compared to output.
E. Risk Factors
While we restrict our discussion to the first-order risk associated with energy deficits, it is important to note that the dynamics of wRPS integration create a number of additional and 
F. Probability of -10-Min Deficit Clusters
Let us use the shorthand "10 min" to represent 10-min epochs. wRPS profiles, such as in Fig. 2 , contain -10-min "natural" clusters of energy deficit, i.e., contiguous 10-min deficits. The cluster lengths may be 10-min or multiple hours long. For example, the dataset for Fig. 3 contains "natural" clusters ranging in length from 10 min to 2 h. While natural clusters are good for description of the experimental data, they pose a challenge for forming reliable probability metrics. Specifically, it is difficult to talk systematically about the probability of "naturally" formed clusters of different sizes.
In the models for this work, we use "synthetic" clustering. We use two different counting methods that bound the range of probabilities of synthetic -10-min cluster sizes. These synthetic clusters are deliberate constructs to ensure that the probability computations yield consistent results.
Application of these probability counting methods (described in Section II-G) produces probabilities for synthetic -10-min windows; i.e., 10 min., 20 min., 30 min., etc. The important point is that the probabilities associated with the synthetic -10-min clusters exist orthogonally; i.e., they can all be combined in the same space without affecting the accuracy of the overall probability estimate. The orthogonal properties allow application of different cost impact factors as discussed in Section II-H. Fig. 4 presents a sample application of the synthetic deficit cluster probability algorithm (SDCPA) described in Section II-G. In this example, we utilize the wind energy generation scenario shown in Fig. 2 as the basis. The wind-firming plus contingency reserve capacity of 7% are assumed to be readily dispatchable to compensate for any and all wind intermittencies.
G. Synthetic Deficit Cluster Probability Algorithm (SDCPA)
This section presents the SDCPA. The algorithm is presented in pseudo-code for simplicity. The SDCPA uses two methods to calculate the probability of energy deficit clusters. Method 0 counts all non-overlapping -10-min synthetic energy deficit clusters. This method produces a slight undercounting as cluster sizes increase. Method 1 counts overlapping -10-min synthetic 
H. Impact of -10-Min Wind Energy Deficits
The second component of risk (3) is the dollar-impact associated with -10-min energy deficits. Impact is the product of the normalized loss-per-hour and the total number of hours in the corresponding -10-min deficit clusters :
Growth in the fraction of energy from wRPS means that most of California's highly interconnected economy will be adversely affected by energy deficits resulting from wind intermittencies. Thus, we calibrate based on broad application of the sector customer damage functions (SCDF) developed in [18] .
is based on the weighted average cost of 1-h energy interruption for all sectors of the economy.
uses a loss basis of $8.76/kWh in 1996 dollars for the entire United States. In this work, our illustrations are computed with the 1996 loss basis of $8.76/kWh. 6 As noted in [18] and [19] , the economic losses associated with multi-10-min deficits is nonlinear, in that the "interruption costs increase with duration in a nonlinear manner." Further, the random and large intermittencies of wRPS generation complicate the calculations. To simplify our models, we apply the 1-h loss-basis linearly across all clusters of deficits. Thus, the cost of larger deficit clusters are underestimates.
Let us posit that California's Gross State Product (GSP) is at parity when there is energy stability; i.e., demand is equal to generation on a 10-min basis. Parity means that the grid, based on data for the entire United States, can supply 100% energy with a reliability of 99.96% (corresponding to the highest reliability of 3.5 h of blackouts per year) [18] . Using and the SDCPA in Section II-G, the model computes the 1-h dollar-impact as shown in Fig. 5 .
For example, Fig. 5 shows at four wRPS penetration levels versus synthetic cluster sizes based on a contingency reserve capacity of up to 7%. At , the ranges from $0.441 million/h to $5.9 million/h.
From application of the synthetic deficit cluster probability algorithm in Section II-G, we obtain the total number of hours corresponding to each -hr cluster shown in Fig. 6 .
For perspective, it is useful to review the dollar-impact of energy deficits during the 2000-2001 energy crises on one California farming operation [17] , [20] . As shown, losses mount and multiply quickly during consecutive multi-10-min (or multi- 6 . Summation of total number of hours corresponding to each n-10-min cluster of energy deficits versus n-10-min clusters. The contingency spinning reserve is up to 7% reserve. hour) disturbances. As further illustrated in [19] , the losses are often under-reported. Businesses generally have low tolerance for blackouts or electrical disturbances-they quickly begin to invest in disturbance mitigation equipment (e.g., backup generators). These investments are non-incremental business-continuity insurance expenditures that, in addition to maintenance, represent loss of profit. The experience of the Land O'Lakes cooperative also illustrates that reliance on interruptible power contracts is not workable if the energy deficits become frequent. Thus, the fact that large businesses sign up for interruptible power programs should not be regarded as an indication of high risk tolerance. Rather, it is an exercise in business operating-cost minimization because these programs offer significant discounts for participation. Fig. 7 . Conservative annualized risk versus n-hr deficit cluster sizes for California at various wRPS penetration levels. The contingency spinning reserve capacity is 7%. Fig. 8 . Energy-supply reliability versus wRPS penetration levels. At wRPS = 20% plus 7% contingency reserve, the reliability drops to 98.11%.
I. Risk Associated With Energy Deficits
As defined in (3) (Section II-C), the annualized risk is the product of the probability of deficits (Section II-F) and the dollar-impact of these deficits (Section II-H). Building on the examples in these sections, we present in Fig. 7 -a view of the risk associated with synthetic clusters of energy deficits. Fig. 7 shows how risk grows with increasing wRPS penetration.
To present a holistic view of risk, we show a risk table in Section II-K.
J. How wRPS Intermittency Reduces Reliability
To the first order, the risk posed by wRPS intermittencies changes California's reliability expectations significantly. Reliability is one minus the probability of energy deficits. At and up to 7% contingency reserve capacity, California's energy generation reliability may drop to 98.11%. This, as compared to nominal baseline performance of 99.96%, represents many hundred 10-min epochs of energy deficits. Fig. 8 presents the reliability profile versus wRPS penetration levels. Beyond the first order, there are higher order risks associated with the frequency of energy deficits; i.e., in the high wRPS scenario, the deficits occur more frequently and randomly. The dollar-losses associated with such instability are largely unknown, but potentially as large as the first order risk presented in this work.
K. Risk Table-A Classical View
To present a comprehensive view of risk, this section utilizes a classical method similar to that from the actuarial sciences. The underlying equations are generally unwieldy-thus, the tabular format is more accessible. In this section, we present one example in Table II . With 7% spinning contingency reserves, California's grid can "sustain" up to . However, the risk for 10-min discrete deficits in wind energy creates about $428 million in probable losses. Again, the risk numbers shown in this work are conservative estimates that rely on some idealized end-point formulations described in [9] .
III. CONCLUSION/SOLUTIONS
This work shows how and why risk quantification analytics methodology should be included in California's wind RPS strategy. The risk table in this work provides a holistic insight into the probable losses (risks) associated with various wRPS penetration levels and up to 7% contingency reserve. The loss-basis shown is conservative. This is further calibrated against estimated losses from California's 2000-2001 energy crises. Using this loss-basis, we estimate that California's risk exposure in a scenario could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars in the best case scenarios considered in this work (e.g., 7% contingency reserves).
If high wRPS penetration levels (e.g., 20%) are combined with high dispatch priority, a significant fraction of the state's GSP [21] is threatened because of the random and large variations in wind energy output. If not directly, the loss in GSP will be felt indirectly as non-incremental expenditures are diverted to wRPS intermittency risk mitigation.
The entire formulation of risk depends on the wind forecast. This creates an impetus for significant investment in wind forecasting technology with the goal of producing estimates that exceed the accuracy of the best-case forecasting in [9] .
There is also a strong impetus for investment in utility-scale storage. The storage solutions also need to provide contingency energy for multiple large wind disturbances within one hour.
With a holistic view of risk, the state needs to re-evaluate the opportunity costs associated with wRPS implementation against the stated goal of achieving reductions. From this work, minimizing energy deficits may require higher standards for contingency spinning reserves (not including power curtailments to energy-consumers). However, the opportunity cost of implementing additional spinning reserves may be prohibitive as compared to other options [9] .
The state must also re-examine whether reliance on interruptible power contracts as a means for maintaining grid stability is workable in the scenario. With the precedence of the 2000-2001 crises coupled with these large risks, it is our view that interruptible power contracts are not workable as wRPS energy deficits increase in frequency, randomness, and length.
